// threat intercept console · trucking & fleets
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Six attack chains — where Trucky × We Secure inject, and what it costs if no one does

Each threat traced top to bottom: how the attack moves, the points where Trucky × We Secure inject detection and knowledge, and the split between a contained incident and the real-world impact if it is missed.

attacker step
we inject
detected & contained
impact if missed
// the six use cases

One program, six points of interception

Most carriers meet these one alert at a time. Pick any chain to see how it runs, where we plug in, and the cost of not catching it.

1RANSOMWARE

The 3 a.m. shutdown

Crews sit inside for a week, move quietly, then encrypt the TMS on a Friday night when no one is watching.
01 · INITIAL ACCESS
PHISH EMAIL
malicious attachment opened
02 · EXECUTION
PAYLOAD RUNS
PowerShell pulls a loader
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · EDR execution rules + threat intel
03 · DWELL & RECON
HIDDEN ACCESS
1–2 weeks mapping the network
04 · LATERAL MOVEMENT
SPREAD TO SERVERS
toward the domain controller
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Lateral-movement alerts + DC watch
05 · STAGING
MASS FILE ACCESS
TMS share, pre-encryption
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Staging alert + ransomware containment playbook
TRUCKY × WE SECURE — 24/7 SOC
// 24/7 soc monitoring
LOGINnew-country, odd hourODD-HOUR
LATERALadmin-share accessFLAGGED
FILESbulk read on TMS shareSTAGING
RULEnew hidden inbox ruleFLAGGED
AUTO-RESPONSE · isolate host → cut network → page on-call
// two ways this ends
DETECTED & CONTAINED
One host quarantined in minutes; dispatch keeps running.
IF NOT DETECTED OR ACTIONED
Fleet-wide encryption · dispatch, billing & tracking down for days · ~$4.4M average breach · risk of closure
IMPACT · CRITICAL
2ENDPOINT COMPROMISE

The laptop is the way in

A fake resume installs a remote tool — antivirus stays silent while an attacker takes the keyboard.
01 · LURE
FAKE RESUME
opened by a recruiter
02 · DELIVERY
REMOTE TOOL
AnyDesk side-loaded
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · RMM-tool detection + allowlisting
03 · EXECUTION
HANDS-ON-KEYBOARD
attacker takes control
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Behaviour analytics + analyst triage
04 · CREDENTIAL ACCESS
BROWSER VAULT
saved logins dumped
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Credential-theft rules + host isolation
05 · EXFIL ATTEMPT
DATA STAGED
files packaged to leave
TRUCKY × WE SECURE — EDR / XDR
// endpoint behaviour
PROCremote-tool launchBEHAVIOR
CREDbrowser credential accessBLOCK
NETunusual outbound C2FLAGGED
FILEarchive + exfil prepSTAGING
AUTO-RESPONSE · kill process → isolate host → reset creds
// two ways this ends
DETECTED & CONTAINED
Host isolated, session killed; nothing leaves the laptop.
IF NOT DETECTED OR ACTIONED
Stolen creds sold · attacker pivots to TMS, email & bank portal · onward fraud and ransomware
IMPACT · HIGH
3BROKER IMPERSONATION

The broker who isn't

A lookalike email books your truck on a real load, then vanishes with the broker's payment.
01 · SETUP
LOOKALIKE DOMAIN
one character off
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Lookalike & new-domain intel
02 · WEAPONIZE
SPOOFED RATE CON
real load, fake identity
03 · DELIVERY
INBOUND TO DISPATCH
urgency, free-mail sender
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Sender auth + gateway quarantine
04 · DECEPTION
BANKING / BOL CHANGE
reroute the load
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Dispatch playbook + verification rule
05 · PAYOUT
LOAD RE-BROKERED
collects and vanishes
TRUCKY × WE SECURE — EMAIL SECURITY
// email gateway
AUTHSPF/DKIM/DMARC failSPOOFED
DOMAINlookalike / newly-regFLAGGED
CONTENTbanking-change + urgencySUSPECT
MAILquarantine before inboxBLOCK
AUTO-RESPONSE · quarantine → warn dispatch → log sender
// two ways this ends
DETECTED & CONTAINED
Email quarantined; dispatch verifies via known number; load stays clean.
IF NOT DETECTED OR ACTIONED
Truck runs the load · broker won't pay · driver, fuel and detention lost · disputes for months
IMPACT · HIGH
4PAYMENT FRAUD · BEC

The wire that never arrived

One 'our bank details changed' email reroutes a real payment in hours.
01 · RECON
INBOX HARVEST
old invoice threads scraped
02 · ACCESS
ACCOUNTANT LOGIN
stolen credentials replayed
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Impossible-travel + session anomaly
03 · STAGING
HIDDEN INBOX RULE
real broker emails diverted
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Mail-rule monitoring + alert
04 · DECEPTION
'NEW BANK DETAILS'
from your own domain
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Outbound-spoof + payment-change rule
05 · TRANSFER
WIRE SENT
to attacker mule account
TRUCKY × WE SECURE — IDENTITY + EMAIL
// finance fraud
AUTHimpossible travelFLAGGED
MAILnew hidden inbox ruleFLAGGED
POLICYbank-change keywordHOLD
WIREout-of-pattern recipientBLOCK
AUTO-RESPONSE · hold payment → revoke session → force MFA reset
// two ways this ends
DETECTED & CONTAINED
Payment held, real broker confirmed by phone; account locked.
IF NOT DETECTED OR ACTIONED
Six-figure wire gone · recall window 24h · insurance fight · damaged broker relationships
IMPACT · HIGH
5CARRIER-IDENTITY THEFT

Your MC number is for sale

They don't want your card — they want your operating authority, to haul and bill as you.
01 · TARGET
FMCSA SCRAPE
your MC, DOT, insurance public
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Brand & domain monitoring
02 · ACCESS
FMCSA PORTAL HIJACK
reset email changed
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Credential-leak intel + alert
03 · DECEPTION
CLONED CARRIER PACKET
your MC, their phone & bank
04 · DELIVERY
BOOKED ON LOADBOARDS
double-brokered in your name
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Loadboard-impersonation watch
05 · PAYOUT
INVOICES FILED AS YOU
money to attacker bank
TRUCKY × WE SECURE — IDENTITY OPS
// brand & authority watch
FMCSAreset-email changeFLAGGED
BRANDMC used on new domainIMPERSONATION
LEAKcredential dump matchEXPOSED
INTELloadboard alias detectedWATCH
AUTO-RESPONSE · alert ops → file FMCSA freeze → notify brokers
// two ways this ends
DETECTED & CONTAINED
Impersonation caught early; FMCSA portal re-secured; brokers warned.
IF NOT DETECTED OR ACTIONED
Loads hauled in your name · cargo claims, lawsuits, FMCSA review · authority at risk
IMPACT · CRITICAL
6MFA BYPASS · IDENTITY

'We have MFA' — and they walk around it

MFA passed. The session still got caught — on behaviour, not on the login.
01 · LURE
AITM PHISH PAGE
real Microsoft login, proxied
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · AiTM-page detection + URL intel
02 · ACCESS
MFA PROMPT PASSED
token stolen mid-flight
03 · PERSISTENCE
SESSION COOKIE REPLAY
no second MFA needed
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Token-binding & session anomaly
04 · ACTION
INBOX RULES + SEND
as the user, from cloud
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · Mail-rule + behaviour analytics
05 · ESCALATE
PUSH-BOMB ADMIN
MFA fatigue on IT account
TRUCKY × WE SECURE INJECTS · MFA-fatigue detection + lock
TRUCKY × WE SECURE — IDENTITY DEFENCE
// identity layer
SESSIONnew device + ASNANOMALY
TOKENcookie reused off-deviceREPLAY
MAILauto-forward to externalFLAGGED
MFArapid push patternFATIGUE
AUTO-RESPONSE · revoke sessions → block sign-ins → reset MFA factors
// two ways this ends
DETECTED & CONTAINED
Session killed before any send-as or wire action.
IF NOT DETECTED OR ACTIONED
Internal phishing from your domain · wire fraud · partner trust damaged · breach reportable
IMPACT · HIGH
threat intercept console · trucking & fleets

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trucky × we secure · cybersecurity for trucking, fleets & logistics